The electromagnetic spectrum is now a critical and increasingly contested part of the modern battlespace. UK and NATO forces depend on it to sense, communicate, navigate and coordinate, while adversaries seek not only to disrupt these functions but to manipulate the information they generate. In an increasingly congested environment, the challenge is therefore not simply maintaining access to the spectrum but knowing whether the information it provides can be trusted.
This creates a growing need to understand and counter electronic deception. By exploiting the complexity and interconnectedness of modern sensors, communications, navigation systems and networks, adversaries can create credible but false representations of activity, location or intent. For UK and NATO forces, which depend on connected sensors, communications and data to build situational awareness, that false picture can deliver a decisive operational effect.
Unlike electronic attack, which typically denies spectrum access through techniques such as jamming, deception is intended to remain less visible. False electromagnetic signatures, manipulated Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) data, imitated emitters and disguised force locations can allow systems to continue operating while undermining the integrity of the information they collect and present.
Although electronic deception is not new, its reach and potential impact have grown significantly. Radar, communications, satellite navigation, datalinks, uncrewed systems, intelligence databases and command-and-control networks now contribute to a shared operating picture. As a result, deception can extend beyond manipulating an individual sensor to influencing what an entire system—and those relying on it—believes to be true.
The growing convergence of cyber warfare and electronic warfare further increases this risk. Modern military systems connect activity in the electromagnetic spectrum with data, networks and decision-support tools. Commanders require speed, but they also need confidence in the provenance, reliability and resilience of the information on which their decisions depend.
This is where electronic deception creates operational advantage. An effect does not need to destroy a platform to alter the course of an operation. If it causes an adversary to relocate a sensor, reposition a force, expend a weapon, redirect intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets or delay a decision, it has already influenced tempo and intent. Denial reveals that a problem exists; deception may allow an adversary to continue acting without recognising that its understanding is false.
Building resilience therefore requires more than equipment proficiency. UK and NATO personnel must be able to recognise anomalies, compare evidence from multiple sources, challenge credible-looking data and make defensible decisions when the electromagnetic environment is congested, degraded or deliberately manipulated.
Realistic training is central to developing that resilience. MASS combines CEMA and Electronic Warfare expertise across signal analysis, mission data, countermeasure development, threat vulnerability analysis, spectrum management and operational support. Through its training portfolio and SESCO methodology, MASS places operators, analysts and commanders in representative electromagnetic environments where emitters behave unexpectedly, indicators conflict and information cannot automatically be trusted.
As electronic deception becomes more credible and accessible, operational readiness will increasingly depend on the ability to question, verify and act with confidence under uncertainty. For the UK and NATO, preparing people to identify and respond to manipulated information is becoming as important as protecting access to the electromagnetic spectrum itself.
Find out more about our EW and CEMA services here.
This article was written by our Senior EW Training, Dave Lewis
